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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Before The Honorable Edward M. Chen, Judge

MEREDITH CALLAHAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

VS. NO. C 20-09203 EMC

PEOPLECONNECT, INC.,

Defendant.

San Francisco, California Thursday, May 13, 2021

TRANSCRIPT OF ZOOM WEBINAR PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES VIA ZOOM:

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Reported By: Marla F. Knox, RPR, CRR, RMR

Official Reporter

Thursday - May 13, 2021 1 1:57 p.m. 2 PROCEEDINGS ---000---3 Calling Civil Action 20 -- excuse me --THE CLERK: 4 5 calling Civil Action 20-9203, Callahan, et al. versus 6 PeopleConnect, Inc., et al. Counsel, please state your appearances for the record, 7 beginning with Counsel for the Plaintiffs. 8 MR. OSBORN: Benjamin Osborn for the Plaintiffs. Good 9 morning, Your Honor. Or good afternoon. 10 11 THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Osborn. MR. RAM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Michael Ram, 12 also for the Plaintiffs. 13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Ram. 14 MS. BERMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Debbie 15 16 Berman for Defendant PeopleConnect, Inc., the Delaware company. 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Thank you, 18 Ms. Berman. Let me ask, I'm sort of curious. The -- the registration 19 20 by Counsel on the two counts under John Doe and John Smith, 21 what was the purpose of that? I mean, was that just to get additional information or is 22 23 there -- I'm trying to understand how that -- what the purpose of that was. 24 MR. OSBORN: Yes, Your Honor. So I registered those 25

accounts. The purpose of registering those accounts was to verify whether my clients' likenesses had, in fact, been taken by Classmates and used to advertise their products.

So it was for the purpose of investigating this case and indeed whether Plaintiffs had a claim or whether there were sufficient facts to support filing a complaint here.

THE COURT: And so without registering, you can't get access to the actual --

MR. OSBORN: That's correct. I would not have been able to include the screenshots and describe in detail what was happening with Plaintiffs' likenesses and photographs in order to file a complaint.

Furthermore, I will add that I attempted to opt out.

There is an opt-out clause provided in the terms of service agreement.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. OSBORN: It requires that you send a letter to Classmates. However, Classmates responded by terminating the account.

So it appears that the opt-out mechanism would have been illusory anyway.

So I really do think it is impossible for me to have built the facts in this case without creating those accounts.

And it was also impossible for me to opt out of the arbitration clause.

THE COURT: All right. So I ask because it raises a fundamental question. How can it be that an attorney's investigation in an attempt to get necessary information to, for instance, establish a cause of action, to prove standing, et cetera, et cetera, suddenly binds the client to -- to waiving their right to -- and access to the courts and to go into arbitration?

Doesn't that, from a 40,000-foot level, implicate really an access to the courts problem?

It is one thing when somebody signs on and they themselves, even, perhaps, unwittingly, signs onto arbitration where they just click and don't read.

But to be bound by what your counsel does in the course of investigating -- unless there is consent.

I assume that the Plaintiffs will contend that they did not consent to Mr. Osborn agreeing to terms of service and agreeing to any arbitration clause?

MR. OSBORN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm making that assumption. If I'm wrong, then maybe it is kind of a moot point.

If they did consent and you said: Hey, this is what happens. You want me to click this thing? And they say yes, then there is no question they have ratified and authorized it.

But here, there is a claim through the agency principle that the attorney acting as agent for the client has,

unbeknownst to the client, bound that client to arbitration. 1 And doesn't that raise kind of fundamental questions, 2 Ms. Berman? 3 MS. BERMAN: So, Your Honor, I think that the 4 5 Independent Living Resource Center case is on point. And that 6 was the exact same argument that the Plaintiffs made there. 7 And this is a very narrow proposition. They are not talking about any action by any counsel at any time on a 8 website would bind their client. This is directly related to 9 the claim. 10 11 And Mr. Osborn just made that very clear to Your Honor, because he said that he went to check to see if they were in --12 13 if they were there. By doing that, he may be the only person who has ever 14 15 viewed their images and he has created the claim itself. 16 So it is directly tied to the claim that they now seek to 17 sue, and that's what the --THE COURT: Hold on. I don't understand that 18 I don't understand that argument. 19 He is there to try to prove that -- that the image is on 20 there so others can look at it. 21 I don't know what you mean by -- you mean creating a claim 22 23 that would otherwise not exist or discovering the claim, discovering proof of the claim? 24

MS. BERMAN: Your Honor, there is no evidence in the

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complaint, nothing pled, that anyone has ever viewed these images other than Mr. Osborn.

And to have a right of publicity claim, someone actually has to view them. It can't just exist in theoretical possibilities.

And the only evidence that we have is the evidence that Mr. Osborn treated himself by going onto the website and agreeing to the terms of service and to take the screenshots.

There is no other -- nothing else is pled in the complaint that these images were ever viewed by anyone, ever seen by anyone, ever used for any purpose. And that is directly tied to the very nature of their claims.

THE COURT: So you are saying --

MR. OSBORN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- the complaint is predicated not on discovering proof but the actual violation upon which the complaint is predicated is the actual viewing by Mr. Osborn. And but-for that, there would be no claim?

MS. BERMAN: Well, Your Honor, I think for some of them, for intrusion and seclusion, if the information is ever -- which we don't think it's a valid claim anyway.

But if it is ever made public, then there is -- how can there be an intrusion and seclusion, into the seclusion of the Plaintiffs' information if it is never viewed by anyone?

THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Osborn.

Is there a place in the complaint where there is an allegation that the members of the public -- member of the public has viewed these pages that contains the likeness and identity of your clients without their permission?

MR. OSBORN: Your Honor, if I may, two responses.

First, that the core of our complaint is our Section 3344 claim, which is a right to publicity claim.

And the violation of the right to publicity arose from the moment Classmates took the Plaintiffs' likeness -- took the Plaintiffs' likenesses and incorporated it into their website advertising and scheme designed to sell subscriptions to classmates.com.

So in addition to -- our allegations in the complaint state that the cause of action arises from that.

And so although the complaint does allege that people viewed the photographs, separate from me, that is actually irrelevant to the Section 3344 claim.

Admittedly, we don't know the facts. We need discovery to know whether people have actually viewed the Plaintiffs' likenesses.

The fact that I discovered by creating the accounts was that, yes, Classmates had gone out. It had misappropriated Plaintiffs' likenesses by copying it and placing it on its for-payment website; and it was generating advertisements using the Plaintiffs' likenesses that advertise both hard cover

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reprints, yearbooks, and subscriptions to the website
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     classmates.com.
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          So it was discovery -- that's what I was doing when I was
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     on the site -- not generating the actual cause of action as it
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     is -- as Ms. Berman contends.
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              THE COURT: Let me ask you --
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              MS. BERMAN: Your Honor --
              THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Ms. Berman.
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          What you are essentially arguing is that the attorney has
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     waived the client's right to a judicial forum by clicking on --
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     in the course of their investigation by clicking on -- either
     viewing or clicking on; correct? That's -- that's the theory.
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              MS. BERMAN: Well, so, Your Honor --
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              THE COURT: Acting as agent; right?
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              MS. BERMAN: I'm sorry. It's -- the Plaintiffs do not
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     dispute that Mr. Osborn went on the website; conducted a
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     search.
          There is -- Mr. Osborn's suggesting that somehow this
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     information just exists if you go onto classmates.com.
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          I can assure you, Your Honor, if you go onto
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     classmates.com, you will not see images of their clients.
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          They were generated because Mr. Osborn went on the
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     website.
              He agreed to the terms of service, and he searched
     for them.
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          It is -- this is not like a website where you just type it
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in and you see --

THE COURT: Hold on, Ms. Berman. I'm not talking about the merits. You are getting to the merits. And you are getting to whether or not there was proof of any violation.

I'm not there yet.

I'm at the beginning stages, which you have now teed up.

So I've asked you a very simple question. I want to make sure

I understand your theory.

Your theory is that the clients are bound by arbitration as a result of their attorney's investigation in which they either use classmates.com or clicked on and created two accounts; correct?

MS. BERMAN: Yes. Our position is that by Mr. Osborn acting as an agent for his client, which they do not deny in their opposition papers, going onto classmates.com; clicking on terms of use and searching for his own clients, that that is directly related to their cause of action, and it binds the client under --

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So let me ask you this question: This is a client being bound by an attorney's action; right?

MS. BERMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you know whether, under California law, an attorney can bind the client to a decision -- there are certain decisions only a client can make; right?

You cannot enter a settlement agreement without a client's 1 consent, for instance; correct? 2 MS. BERMAN: Correct. 3 THE COURT: You cannot dismiss a claim without your 4 5 client's consent; correct? 6 MS. BERMAN: Correct, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Can the -- can an attorney, under California law, waive a client's right to go to court and agree 8 to arbitration without the client's consent? 9 I believe under the Independent Living 10 MS. BERMAN: 11 Resource Center case versus Uber, which was decided in 2019, it was the very exact same issue. And they said yes. 12 13 THE COURT: Did the Court look at the question of agency -- scope of agency between attorney and client? 14 MS. BERMAN: They determined that it was -- that they 15 16 were acting as their agent. And because they were acting as 17 their agent, they bound them. 18 MR. OSBORN: Your Honor, may I respond to the Uber 19 case in particular? 20 Yeah. And if you know the answer to my THE COURT: 21 question -- it is a California scope of attorney power 22 question -- but go ahead. 23 MR. OSBORN: I do not know the answer to your question. I can assure you that I had no discussions with my 24 25 clients regarding creating accounts.

And that's pled -- that's pled very clearly in our position papers -- or not pled but stated clearly in our opposition papers.

With respect to *Uber*, I think the primary distinction here is that the claims in *Uber* arose from someone's use of that application; right.

So the claims in *Uber* were seniors alleging that they were receiving longer wait times for Uber rides than non-seniors did. And they filed a complaint saying: Hey, we are getting longer wait times.

And they said in the complaint: Well, we don't actually use Uber. We just had a paralegal at the firm that was doing our case get onto Uber and test whether, if that person were an elderly client, they would have gotten longer wait times.

And the Court said: Yes, there is an agency that exists between the paralegal and the seniors who would have brought the case.

There is language from the case talking about the fact that the claims arose from use of the application. Those seniors don't even have a cause of action against Uber unless they get on the app and they ask for a ride and they get a long wait time.

Here, it is completely different. My clients' claims arose from the moment Classmates went out and copied their photographs and put them on the website.

That's when the claims arose. And those claims existed; that theft occurred, independent of whether I ever got on the site or whether my clients ever got on the site and used Classmates.

THE COURT: Well, there is a case called Blanton versus Womancare, 38 Cal.3d 396, 1985, California Supreme Court case, holding that the attorney lacked authority to waive substantial rights of a Plaintiff by entering into a binding arbitration agreement, noting the Plaintiff did not consent to the agreement and did nothing beyond retention of the attorney to suggest that he had authority to enter into such an agreement and then repudiated the agreement as soon as she learned about it.

It held that the attorney, merely by virtue of his employment as such, has no apparent authority to bind the client to an agreement for arbitration.

That's just the summary. But that strongly indicates to me that -- and not surprisingly, this is one of those fundamental decisions that requires an attorney to -- the client to consent.

And if I'm right and that case so holds, then I don't see how the attorney in the course of doing some investigation, whether wittingly or unwittingly, ended up signing and being party to an arbitration agreement can bind the client without the client's consent. That's the problem I see here.

MS. BERMAN: So, Your Honor, I think that case is very distinguishable in many aspects.

The case had already been pending. And I believe in that case, that the Plaintiff had told her lawyer that she would not agree to binding arbitration; and he went ahead and did it anyway. When she found out, she fired him and got a new lawyer and went to court.

That didn't happen here. When we raised this argument, there was no repudiation. There was no firing of the lawyer. There was no statements whatsoever.

Now, you may hear them now because you have represented that case; but that is not what happened in this case. And I think that those facts are very different, and that's what was motivating the Court in that case because the lawyer directly violated direction from its client --

THE COURT: You think that case hinges on a directive from the client not to engage in arbitration; and they did it anyway, not on the principle of what is within the scope of an attorney's power, vis-a-vis the client' power? That is your reading of the case?

MS. BERMAN: I think that is one of the distinctions.

I think another distinction is the waiver here happened before the lawsuit was filed, not during the course of the action. And I think that changes the dynamics as well.

THE COURT: Why does that make a difference?

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Because it wasn't during -- it wasn't a MS. BERMAN: decision during the litigation as to whether it should proceed in arbitration or in a lawsuit. This was before that happened. THE COURT: So this -- let me ask -- let me make sure I have the sequence. This -- going onto the website, when did it occur? December 6th, 2020, before the lawsuit was filed; right? weeks before the lawsuit was filed. So tell me again, how does that -- how does the timing affect the scope of agency question? I'm trying to understand that. MS. BERMAN: I think it was relevant in the Blanton case that it was during the course of ongoing litigation that the decision was made without permission. That's not the facts in our case. Neither one of those facts existed. It wasn't during the course of litigation, and it wasn't -- it wasn't at the direct -- in direct contradiction to what that client had ordered. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Osborn, your response, if any. MR. OSBORN: I'm -- on the particular point of the

MR. OSBORN: I'm -- on the particular point of the Blanton case, I think the Blanton case is about the scope of what is appropriate for an attorney to be able to waive on behalf of the client.

Going back to Your Honor's points about when the

circumstances are that an attorney needs to get explicit direction from the client in order to be able to waive their rights, this feels very much like one of these circumstances.

I couldn't dismiss this claim without their permission; nor could I have waived arbitration without their permission.

Furthermore, I will add two arguments, both of which appear in our brief.

First, the terms of service itself that I clicked and agreed to expressly provide that -- I'm not allowed to transfer those rights to any third party.

The contract that Classmates drafted forbids that I should be able to, as an agent, bind someone else.

So their own contract forbids the argument they are trying to make here.

THE COURT: Well, transferring a right is transferring benefits. That doesn't necessarily say who is bound and who is not by the burdens.

I mean, I understand your argument. I'm not sure there is a perfect alignment there, but go on.

MR. OSBORN: Sure.

It would be very surprising to me if I could transfer one-half of that contract but not the other. That would seem unjust, but, perhaps, there is precedent for that kind of application. I'm not sure.

And the other -- the other point I would like to make is

that an -- in a case -- a recently decided case called *Lukis*versus White Pages -- which is a case in which PeopleConnect

owns one of the defendants. It is called Instant Checkmate -
has business practices very similar to Classmates. This exact

same argument was advanced regarding arbitration.

Instant Checkmate argued that -- that the counsel's investigation of the claim by visiting the website Instant Checkmate led to -- led to the client being -- the Court rejected that argument.

Now, rejected on grounds different than whether it is possible or agency theory; but it did address the agency theory argument and referred to it as dubious.

And the point the Court made there was that the claims had arisen before the attorney ever visited the website, which is exactly what it is here.

MS. BERMAN: Your Honor, if I may.

Instant Checkmate is not a party to that case. That is a case against White Pages. It was White Pages who is an entity unrelated to any of my clients who brought that motion.

Judge Feinerman found that the arbitration claim be dismissed, the motion to compel arbitration, because it had been waived, because White Pages waited a year and a half to bring that lawsuit.

And in that lawsuit, Mr. -- Judge Feinerman did not find -- what Judge Feinerman said specifically was that the

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alleged consent took place a year and a half after the lawsuit
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     had been pending, and that's what he found dubious. Not -- he
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     did not, in anyplace in this case, say that it was dubious that
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     a lawyer could bind their client to a motion -- to an
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     arbitration agreement. He said because --
              MR. OSBORN:
                           Sorry.
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              MS. BERMAN: -- it happened --
              THE COURT: Let her finish. One at a time.
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              MS. BERMAN: He said because -- that's what he says.
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     It was a year and a half into the litigation. That's what he
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     finds dubious.
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          He challenged White Pages' dubious premise that Costales'
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     use of the website a year into the litigation to better
     understand it. That's all he says about that point.
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          The entire opinion, Your Honor, is devoted to waiver.
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     is entirely irrelevant.
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          We didn't wait a year and a half. This is our first
     responsive pleading in this case. We promptly moved to compel
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                   This case is not --
     arbitration.
              THE COURT: Well, there is nobody arguing waiver on
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     that front here, so I understand.
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          You have a response briefly, Mr. Osborn.
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              MR. OSBORN: Yes, very briefly.
          Instant Checkmate is a Defendant in that case. Ms. Berman
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     is correct, and I'm sorry I misstated that.
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The White Pages was the Defendant who asserted the argument in question here.

Nevertheless, White Pages' business practices are very similar to those of Classmates. And I would say is very clear, based on those sentences that Ms. Berman just read, that the word "dubious" refers to the premise, quote, of her counsel's use of the website to better understand how it works and to better represent her, subjects her right to publicity claims, which, of course, are rare before the litigation commenced to arbitration.

It is hard for me to read that sentence in a way other
than the Court found it dubious that the attorney who consented
to arbitration on the --

THE COURT: All right. Well, I have the cases. I will take a second look at that, and I will take the matter under submission and rule accordingly. So --

MR. RAM: Your Honor, may I please add my two cents?

THE COURT: Two cents.

MR. RAM: Mr. Osborn mentioned at the beginning of the hearing -- and it may have gotten lost -- that he opted out of the arbitration clause pursuant to the provision in the contract that allows one to opt out.

And that in response, the Defendant cancelled his agreement. So he did opt out of the arbitration provision, Your Honor.

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submission.

Is that alleged, that there was -- I mean, THE COURT: the actual compliance with the opt-out procedure, sending a letter, et cetera, et cetera? That is not alleged in -- I want to be MR. OSBORN: very clear. So the accounts that I created to investigate, the ones that I accessed in December before filing the complaint, I did not follow the opt-out procedure for; and that opt-out procedure was waived after 30 days. So after Classmates raised its arbitration argument, I created an additional account to test whether the opt-out procedure actually is viable. And that's where I have a record of me sending a letter, and I have an e-mail I got back from Classmates saying we terminated your account. And I would be very happy to introduce a declaration to that effect. I did not do so before this hearing because with -- all of this happened yesterday, and I thought it would be much to the Court's annoyance were I to file a declaration a day before the hearing. THE COURT: Well, I don't know if I need you to do If I do, if I'm interested, I will let you know. right now I'm going to go with the record that we have.

All right. Thank you, Counsel. I will take it under

1	MS. BERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: Thank you.
3	MR. OSBORN: Thank you.
4	THE CLERK: Court is adjourned.
5	(Proceedings adjourned at 2:19 p.m.)
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8	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
9	We certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
10	from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
11	
12	DATE: Wednesday, May 26, 2021
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15	Marla Krox
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17	Marla F. Knox, RPR, CRR, RMR U.S. Court Reporter
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